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Abstract 
While there is ample evidence that children treat words as mutually exclusive, the cognitive basis 
of this bias is widely debated. We focus on the distinction between pragmatic and lexical 
constraints accounts. High-functioning children with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) offer a 
unique perspective on this debate, as they acquire substantial vocabularies despite impoverished 
social-pragmatic skills. We tested children and adolescents with ASD in a paradigm examining 
mutual exclusivity for words and facts. Words were interpreted contrastively more often than 
facts. Word performance was associated with vocabulary size; fact performance was associated 
with social-communication skills. Thus mutual exclusivity does not appear to be driven by 
pragmatics, suggesting that it is either a lexical constraint or a reflection of domain-general 
learning processes.  
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In Categorization and Naming in Children (1989), Ellen Markman presented a set of 
questions and phenomena that have fueled research on word learning for twenty years. Early 
cognitive accounts of language acquisition focused primarily on syntax (see the papers in Slobin, 
1985 for examples and Clark, 1973 for a discussion), perhaps because many theorists assumed 
that word learning could be explained by simple associations between word forms and referents.  
This assumption was challenged by researchers who pointed out that the midcentury 
philosophical critiques of empiricism (Quine, 1960; Goodman, 1966) were transparently 
applicable to the problem of lexical acquisition; that is, the input itself can never logically 
disambiguate the meaning of a word (see e.g., Macnamara, 1982; Markman & Hutchinson, 1984, 
Landau, Smith & Jones, 1988). The experiments that followed demonstrated that young children 
do not learn words through brute force associative learning; instead they approach the task with a 
set of constraints that help guide them to the correct meaning, minimizing the need for extensive 
observation. For example, children preferentially map labels to whole objects, rather than their 
parts or other qualities, and they extend these labels to other members of the same taxonomic 
category, rather than to thematically-associated objects (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984; 
Markman, 1990). In the case of novel artifacts, these taxonomic categories are typically inferred 
on the basis of the object’s shape or function, rather than its color, texture, or location (Landau, 
Smith, & Jones, 1988; Kemler Nelson, Frankenfield, Morris & Blaire, 2000).  
The discovery of these constraints on word learning immediately raised questions about 
their origins and their scope. Are these particular constraints present at the onset of word learning 
or do they emerge as the product of prior word learning (see e.g., Smith, 1999; Smith, Jones, 
Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe & Samuelson, 2002)? Are these constraints specific to word learning Mutual Exclusivity       4
or are they side effects of more general constraints on conceptualization or communication (see 
e.g., Bloom, 2000; Clark 1990)? This paper focuses on two theories about the scope and origins 
of a constraint that Markman dubbed “mutual exclusivity” (Markman & Wachtel, 1988). 
  Mutual exclusivity, in Markman’s theory, is the learner’s bias to assume that category 
labels apply to mutually exclusive sets of objects and thus each object has only one category 
label. This bias is evidenced by children’s tendency to avoid a second label for a single referent. 
For example, imagine a child sitting in the kitchen with her mother. Two objects previously 
unknown to the child, a pepper and a bok choy, are in front of her on the counter. The mother 
holds the pepper up to her child and states, “What a pretty pepper!” Given the social cues 
available in this context, the child will presumably link this label, correctly, to the pepper.  
Imagine next that the mother puts the pepper back down on the counter and says, “Bok choy is 
delicious!” while glancing in the general direction of both vegetables.  Mutual exclusivity, and 
experiments that support it, suggest that the child will be able to infer that the new label (“bok 
choy”) applies to the unlabeled object (the bok choy), despite the ambiguous social cues that 
accompany this utterance.   
Mutual exclusivity is a robust phenomenon.  It has been observed in a variety of 
experimental paradigms, in children as young as 12 months of age (Clark, 1988; Diesendruck & 
Markson, 2001; Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Bailey, & Wenger, 1992; Graham, Poulin-Dubois, & 
Baker, 1998; Halberda, 2003, 2006; Littschwager & Markman, 1994; Markman, Wasow, & 
Hansen, 2003; Scofield & Behrend, 2007; Xu, Cote, & Baker, 2005). The phenomenon is present 
in diverse populations, including bilingual children (Davidson, Jergovic, Imami, & Theodos, 
1997; Davidson & Tell, 2005), deaf and hard-of-hearing children (Lederberg, Prezbindowski, & 
Spencer, 2000), children with William’s Syndrome (Stevens & Karmiloff-Smith, 1997), and Mutual Exclusivity       5
children with autism (Preissler & Carey, 2005). But while there is ample evidence that children 
treat words as mutually exclusive, the cognitive basis of this bias is widely debated (Bloom, 
2000; Clark, 1990; Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Markman et al., 2003; Merriman & Bowman, 
1989; Mervis, Golinkoff & Bertram, 1994). 
  Two types of paradigms have been used to demonstrate mutual exclusivity. These subtly 
different paradigms support very different inferences about the nature of the constraint.  
Novelty paradigms (Graham et al., 1998; Halberda, 2003; Markman & Wachtel, 1988; 
Preissler & Carey, 2005) present participants with one familiar object (e.g., a ball) and one novel 
object, and then ask them to produce an object based on a novel label (e.g., “give me the wug”). 
Participants typically select the novel object in this context. Although critical to the early 
observations of mutual exclusivity, novelty paradigms are limited in that they confound novelty 
with exclusivity. That is, the only novel object is also the only unlabeled object, so when 
children select the novel object, we cannot be certain that they are selecting this object because it 
is unlabeled (and thus treating words exclusively), or on the basis of its novelty alone, perhaps 
reflecting a simple preference for novel objects, or a tendency to match novelty to novelty.  
Exclusivity paradigms (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Scofield & Behrend, 2007; Xu et 
al., 2005) remove the novelty confound by presenting children with two novel objects, labeling 
one with a novel label (e.g., “this is a jop”), and then asking for an object using a second novel 
label (e.g., “give me the wug”). Since both objects are novel, the possibility that children are 
solving this task by simply matching novelty to novelty can be ruled out, and we can conclude 
that children are selecting the novel object because it is unlabeled. Exclusivity paradigms thus 
provide clear evidence that the child is making the inference that novel words go with unlabeled 
objects.  Mutual Exclusivity       6
Several theories have been put forward to explain the robust mutual exclusivity bias; the 
two theories that are most relevant for the present experiment are the pragmatic account and the 
lexical constraints account. The pragmatic account proposes that mutual exclusivity is just one 
manifestation of broader social communicative competence (Clark, 1990; Bloom, 2000; 
Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Markman & Woodward, 1998). Infants are able to make 
inferences about adults’ intentions including their communicative or referential intentions 
(Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996; Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Olineck & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2005; Woodward, 1998). According to the pragmatic hypothesis, this ability to 
infer referential intentions is the basis of exclusivity effects. For example, Clark (1987, 1990) 
proposes that listeners (infants and adults) are guided by the principle of contrast, which posits 
that different linguistic forms arise from different communicative intentions. Specifically in the 
case of referential terms (noun phrases or descriptions), listeners assume that different forms 
must pick out different referents. This can be seen as an implicature arising from the Gricean 
maxim of manner which states that speakers will state things in the simplest and least ambiguous 
manner possible (1957). If an object already has a mutually known label, failure to use this label 
implies that the speaker must not intend to refer to that object. To extend the earlier example, on 
the pragmatic hypothesis, the child who hears “bok choy” (unconsciously) reasons as follows: “if 
mom had wanted to refer to that object [the pepper] she would have used the same description as 
before (‘pepper’), but she used a different description, so she must be referring to something else 
and this [the bok choy] is the only likely candidate.”  
In contrast to the pragmatic account, the lexical constraints account proposes that early in 
word learning, children assume that words (or at least object labels) refer to mutually exclusive 
categories, such that individual objects are assigned one, and only one, object label (Markman & Mutual Exclusivity       7
Wachtel, 1988). Based on this assumption, children reject objects with known names as possible 
referents for novel words, whittling down the number of possible referents. When an unlabeled 
object is present during a labeling act with a novel word, then the whole object constraint 
(Markman, 1990) will lead children to assume that the novel label applies to this object. On this 
hypothesis, both constraints are domain-specific mechanisms specific to word learning 
(Markman, 1992; see also Merriman & Bowman, 1989, Golinkoff et al. 1994). In our earlier 
example, a child using the mutual exclusivity constraint would (unconsciously) reason as 
follows: “That object [the pepper] is called a ‘pepper’, so it can’t be called ‘bok choy.’ But this 
object [the bok choy] doesn’t have another name, so it must be the bok choy.”  
A third type of theory, the domain-general account, attributes the phenomenon of mutual 
exclusivity to domain-general learning processes. On domain-general accounts, word learning 
constraints are either a direct reflection of the structure of domain-general learning mechanisms 
or are the result of applying these learning mechanisms to input which has underlying structure 
that gives rise to the relevant constraint (Smith et al., 2002; Regier, 2005).
1 For example, Regier 
(2003) proposes that mutual exclusivity arises from general mechanisms of competition in a 
connectionist network. As a word becomes more associated with one referent the probability that 
the same word will be used with another referent declines sharply. Similarly, Frank and 
colleagues (2009) were able to simulate mutual exclusivity effects in a Bayesian model of word 
learning and intention reading which contained no initial structure or parameters that were 
                                                        
1 Constraints were initially motivated by the need to limit the possible hypotheses that the child 
considered to avoid the logical problem of induction (Quine, 1960; Goodman, 1966).  
Consequently, theories that posit that constraints are learned via association would seem to risk 
circularity. In practice they avoid it by positing that word meanings are drawn from a finite 
hypothesis space. In other words, the initial, strong constraints in such models are built into the 
input representation. Mutual Exclusivity       8
specifically linguistic in nature. These domain-general models present a compelling challenge for 
the lexical constraints account, which we explore further in the discussion section. However, for 
now we put the domain-general theory aside, as the current study was designed to distinguish 
between pragmatic and lexical constraints accounts. 
The pragmatic account and the lexical constraints account differ in their scope: although 
lexical constraints apply only to words, the ability to infer speakers’ referential intent should 
apply to all speech acts, including descriptions of objects. Studies of conversational 
communication have demonstrated that speakers typically settle on a single form for a given 
referent and then use it throughout their discourse. Initially these descriptions may be long and 
variable, but they become shorter and more predictable as interlocutors settle on a common 
referential understanding (Krauss & Weinheimer, 1966). Thus listeners expect speakers to refer 
to the same object consistently, because this is what they typically do.  
Diesendruck and Markson (2001) tested the prediction that exclusivity applies to diverse 
speech acts by comparing children’s tendency to treat words contrastively with their tendency to 
treat facts contrastively. A standard exclusivity task was used to test exclusivity for words (label 
condition) and a parallel task was constructed to test exclusivity for facts (fact condition).  
Specifically, one of the two novel objects was linked to a novel fact (“my sister gave me this”) 
and children were then asked to produce the referent of a second novel fact (“Can you give me 
the one my dog likes to play with?”). Diesendruck and Markson reasoned that if mutual 
exclusivity was subserved by a lexical constraint, then children should treat words as exclusive, 
but not facts. In contrast, if mutual exclusivity was the result of a broader social pragmatic 
constraint, then both words and facts should be treated as exclusive. They found that three-year-
olds performed similarly in the label and fact conditions, treating both forms as exclusive. Thus Mutual Exclusivity       9
they concluded that the same social pragmatic inference accounted for performance in both 
conditions. This is spelled out as Hypothesis A, below. But note that these results are logically 
compatible with the possibility that exclusivity for words and facts are subserved by different 
mechanisms that just happen to be equally robust in three-year-old children. This is spelled out 
as Hypothesis B.  
Hypothesis A (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001): A single factor, social pragmatics, 
underlies children’s tendencies to treat words and facts contrastively. This tendency is 
driven by children’s expectation that speakers will refer to a single object consistently. 
This expectation alone accounts for the mutual exclusivity bias. 
Hypothesis B: Different mechanisms account for exclusivity in words and facts. The 
tendency to treat words as mutually exclusive is the result of lexical constraint, and thus 
specific to word learning. However, children also have access to social pragmatic 
reasoning processes that may lead them to treat facts contrastively as well.  
In the absence of further data, Hypothesis A should be favored on the basis of parsimony. Why 
posit two mechanisms when one will do? However, given the pervasiveness of exclusivity for 
words, it is critical to determine whether exclusivity for facts is present in the same range of 
tasks and populations. Any lack of parallelism in the development or prevalence of exclusivity 
for words and other speech acts would favor Hypothesis B.  
Preliminary support for Hypothesis B comes from research on mutual exclusivity at 
earlier stages of development. Scofield and Behrend (2007) found that two-year-olds treat words 
as exclusive but not facts, suggesting that separate mechanisms may underlie performance in the 
two conditions (see also Markson, 2005). This data, however, is difficult to interpret due to the 
young age of the participants. To use the principle of contrast, the child must recognize that the Mutual Exclusivity       10
speaker is producing two different referential forms. In the case of the words this simply involves 
representing the phonological forms of the two labels and comparing them (“zav” is not “koba”). 
In contrast, the facts are phrases that are longer in length and have internal syntactic and 
semantic structure. Furthermore in this task the syntactic form of the facts shifts from the 
exposure phrase in which a declarative form is used (“My uncle gave me this”) to the test phase, 
in which a definite description is produced (“The one my cat stepped on”). Very young children, 
with limited linguistic abilities, may have difficulty representing these facts, holding them in 
memory, or comparing them to determine whether a contrasting form was used (Markson, 2005). 
Even if they succeed at all of these tasks, they may have fewer resources left for making 
inferences about the experimenter’s referential intent. Thus, for two-year-olds, performance on 
the label condition may be superior to performance on the fact condition simply because the 
labels are simpler. Thus additional work is needed to understand whether the contrastive 
interpretation of words and the contrastive interpretation of facts are driven by the same 
cognitive mechanisms as the pragmatic account proposes. 
 To tease apart Hypotheses A and B, above, we have chosen to look at mutual exclusivity 
in a group of children and adolescents who show impoverished social pragmatic reasoning, 
specifically individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental 
disorder characterized by profound deficits in social interaction and communication, and by 
repetitive and restricted behaviors and interests (APA, 2000). Individuals with ASD are notably 
impaired in their ability to infer speakers’ referential intent (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986; 
Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1998; Sabbagh, 1999). Within the ASD population, there is 
great heterogeneity in terms of linguistic abilities; many never go on to develop fluent speech, 
while others demonstrate superior verbal skills (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Tager-Mutual Exclusivity       11
Flusberg, 2006). However, even for those who develop average and above average language 
skills, pragmatic abilities are universally impaired (Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005). In 
contrast, vocabulary development tends to be an area of relative strength (Jarrold, Boucher, & 
Russell, 1997; Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001). Although most linguistic and communicative 
skills for individuals with ASD (such as conversational discourse and nonverbal communication) 
tend to fall below what would be expected given their overall cognitive levels, vocabulary size is 
often commensurate with overall cognitive capacities. The fact that many children with ASD are 
able to build substantial vocabularies despite impoverished social pragmatic skills provides a 
preliminary suggestion that pragmatic skills may not be a necessary condition for word learning 
and vocabulary development. With respect to mutual exclusivity this suggests two possibilities: 
(1) mutual exclusivity is a pragmatic skill but highly verbal children with ASD are able to use 
other cues and strategies to compensate for the absence of mutual exclusivity (consistent with the 
pragmatic hypothesis) or (2) mutual exclusivity is fully present in verbal children with ASD 
suggesting that it does not depend on the kind of pragmatic skills that are impaired in this 
population (consistent with a lexical constraints hypothesis). 
Because children with ASD show such profound deficits in social interaction, studies of 
word learning in ASD have primarily focused on how these children’s social deficits interfere 
with their word learning. Children with ASD are notably impaired in their ability to initiate and 
follow joint attention, a deficit associated with extensive delays in early language acquisition 
(Bono, Daley, & Sigman, 2004; Loveland & Landry, 1986; Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1990). 
The abilities of children with ASD to follow a speaker’s direction of gaze (Baron-Cohen, 
Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997) and focus of attention (McDuffie, Yoder, & Stone, 2006) have been 
shown to be significantly related to their ability to correctly apply novel labels to novel objects. Mutual Exclusivity       12
The ability to interpret speakers’ referential cues appears to be more of a rate-limiting step to 
word learning for children with ASD than for children with typical development (TD), 
presumably because their deficits in this area present roadblocks for acquisition (Parish-Morris, 
Hennon, Hirsh-Pasek, Golinkoff, & Tager-Flusberg, 2007). Despite these limitations, the 
majority of children with ASD ( > 80%) are able to learn words, particularly nouns, by middle 
childhood (Lord, Risi, & Pickles, 2004). In fact, children with ASD have been shown to apply 
some of the same constraints that TD children do, such as interpreting novel words as referring 
to objects rather than actions (Swensen, Kelley, Fein, & Naigles, 2007).    
To our knowledge, only one published study has examined the mutual exclusivity bias in 
children with ASD. Preissler and Carey (2005) studied mutual exclusivity in 20 five- to nine-
year-old children with autism. Their sample had a mean receptive vocabulary age equivalent of 
23 months. These children were impaired in their ability to use speakers’ direction of gaze as a 
strategy for making word-object mappings, suggesting that they did not use speakers’ referential 
intent to guide word learning. The same group of children, however, successfully completed a 
novelty task; that is, when presented with a familiar object and an unfamiliar object and asked to 
show the experimenter a “blicket,” they reliably chose the unfamiliar object. The low verbal 
level of the participants likely motivated the simpler paradigm that was used in this study. The 
novelty task consisted of only two trials: one trial included a familiar drawing and a novel 
drawing as stimuli, the second trial used a familiar object and a novel object. The familiar things 
were always natural kinds (apple and duck) and the novel things were complex artifacts (airpump 
and noisemaker). Despite their impairment in using eye gaze to infer referential intent, the 
children systematically paired the novel words with the novel referents. However, this study was 
limited by the presence of a novelty confound. We cannot be certain that the phenomenon they Mutual Exclusivity       13
observed is really about exclusivity. That is, the children in their study could simply have been 
matching novelty to novelty, or showing a preference for novel, mechanical objects if the task 
was unclear, a possibility that is even more likely for children with ASD, who often show a 
distinct preference for mechanical objects (South, Ozonoff, & McMahon, 2005). To conclude 
that children are truly using an exclusivity strategy, an exclusivity paradigm must be used.  
In the current study, we use Diesendruck and Markson’s (2001) exclusivity paradigm to 
compare children’s exclusivity for words with their exclusivity for facts. Our goal was to answer 
three questions. First, are individuals with ASD truly using exclusivity in word learning despite 
their pragmatic impairments? If so, this suggests that the cognitive basis of exclusivity is not 
tightly tied to social pragmatic skills. Second, do individuals with ASD apply exclusivity to other 
referential acts, such as factual descriptions? This provides an index of children’s ability to use 
contrasting forms to make inferences about the referential intent of others. Third, what are the 
correlates of using exclusivity for words and for facts? Individuals with ASD provide advantages 
for studying typical developmental processes such as word learning (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996; 
Marcus & Rabagliati, 2006), in part because they introduce more variability, within and across 
domains, than is found in typical populations. We take advantage of this variability to explore 
additional predictions of pragmatic and lexical constraints accounts.   
In contrast to Preissler and Carey (2005), we limited our sample to participants who had 
average or above average language abilities for their age. As we noted earlier, comprehension of 
the facts may be taxing for children with limited linguistic abilities, thus we wanted to ensure 
that participants in this study had verbal skills that were at least as well developed as the three- to 
four-year-old children who succeed in this task (Diesendruck & Markson, 2001; Scofield & 
Behrend, 2007). In addition, the exclusivity task itself is demanding, involving two novel Mutual Exclusivity       14
linguistic forms and two novel objects, thus lower functioning children might fail for 
uninteresting reasons.   
We compared our participants with ASD to TD controls who were matched on age and 
vocabulary ability. Two different age groups were tested (children and adolescents) to explore 
whether exclusivity for words and facts changes over development. Previous studies have 
demonstrated that word learning strategies change over development (Halberda, under review; 
Merriman & Bowman, 1989; Nazzi & Bertoncini, 2003), but this work has focused on 
development in the first four years of life. On the pragmatic hypothesis, exclusivity for words 
and facts should remain yoked across the lifespan. Finally, for a subset of the participants we 
conducted a control task to assess memory and attention for novel words and facts. Even high-
functioning individuals with ASD often have deficits in attention (Landry & Bryson, 2004; 
Townsend, Harris, & Courchesne, 1996) and memory (Bennetto, Pennington, & Rogers, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2005). The control task allowed us to disentangle the role of these factors in any 
group differences that emerge.  
A pragmatic account and a lexical constraints account predict different patterns of 
findings from the current study. Critically, a pragmatic account attributes performance on the 
fact and label conditions to a single, underlying factor: the ability to infer speakers’ referential 
intent. The pragmatic account thus predicts that both diagnostic groups should treat words and 
facts as mutually exclusive to an equivalent degree. With respect to group differences, the 
pragmatic account predicts that the TD group should perform better than the pragmatically-
impaired ASD group on both conditions, since they each rely on the ability to infer referential 
intent. In addition, because exclusivity for facts and exclusivity for words are produced by the 
same cognitive mechanism, then any individual characteristics that are related to one should be Mutual Exclusivity       15
related to the other. A lexical constraints account, on the other hand, attributes performance on 
the two conditions to very different factors: the mutual exclusivity constraint in the label 
condition, and some other process, perhaps social pragmatic reasoning, in the fact condition.  
Thus there is no reason to expect the tasks to pattern together in either population. On the lexical 
constraints hypothesis there is also no reason to expect that participants in the ASD will be 
impaired on the label condition, since the lexical constraint that it taps is independent of social 
pragmatic skills and the children and adolescents that we are testing do not have intellectual or 
lexical impairments. While this hypothesis does not make any specific predictions with regard to 
the fact condition, it leaves open the possibility that performance in this task is driven by social 
pragmatic skill and will be impaired in ASD. Finally, since performance on the two conditions is 
thought to be driven by distinct mechanisms, a lexical constraints account does not predict that 
individual differences associated with one condition are necessarily associated with the other. 
That is, different factors may be associated with performance in the fact and label conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
Children and adolescents with ASD. Participants were 30 children and 18 adolescents 
with high functioning ASD, recruited from special needs schools in New England, through 
community groups serving parents of children with special needs, and by word of mouth. 
Participants were initially selected based on a parent’s report that the child both had an ASD 
(Autistic Disorder, PDD-NOS, or Asperger’s Disorder) and had language abilities that were 
approximately at chronological age level.  
Parents of all participants completed the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; 
Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003), a screener for symptoms of ASD. For the younger age group, Mutual Exclusivity       16
ASD diagnoses were confirmed through the review of clinical diagnostic reports provided by the 
parents when these were available. When diagnostic reports were not available children were 
required to meet criteria for an ASD diagnosis on the SCQ. One participant failed to do so and 
was excluded. For the older age group, diagnoses were confirmed through the administration of 
the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & Risi, 2002), 
Module 3 or 4, by a trained clinician (AdM). One participant was excluded for failure to meet 
criteria for an ASD diagnosis on the ADOS. 
Receptive vocabulary was assessed with the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT; 
Dunn & Dunn, 1997). Participants were included who had PPVT scores of 85 or above. Four 
participants with ASD were excluded for scoring below this cutoff. Thus the final ASD sample 
consisted of 26 children and 16 adolescents. Participant details are given in Table 1. 
Typically developing children and adolescents. The ASD sample was compared to a 
sample of TD children and adolescents who were matched on chronological age and receptive 
vocabulary. Participants were 52 children and 16 adolescents with a typical developmental 
history, including no first-degree relatives with an ASD diagnosis, no developmental delays, and 
no known neurological impairments. Participants were recruited through their schools and via 
word of mouth. 28 participants were excluded for the following reasons: failure to match to the 
ASD group (n = 20), high score (above nine) on the SCQ (n = 4), experimenter error in task 
administration (n = 3), and for current concerns regarding social impairments (n = 1). The final 
TD group consisted of 24 children and 16 adolescents.  
Standardized Measures 
The PPVT (Dunn & Dunn, 1997) is a widely used measure of receptive vocabulary from 
preschool age to adulthood. Participants are presented with four pictures of objects, actions, and Mutual Exclusivity       17
events from which they must select the appropriate referent of a word stated by the experimenter. 
The reliability and validity of this measure are well established.  
The SCQ (Rutter et al., 2003) is a 40-item parent questionnaire for the screening of ASD 
symptoms in children. Items on the measure were derived from the Autism Diagnostic Interview 
– Revised (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994), which is considered to be a highly valid 
measure for diagnosing ASD. When used as a screening instrument, a cutoff score of 15 is 
recommended as an indication of a possible ASD (Rutter et al., 2003). 
The ADOS (Lord et al., 2002) is a semi-structured assessment for the diagnosis of ASD, 
which provides multiple opportunities for social and communicative engagement. The reliability 
and validity of this measure are well established. Depending on their age and maturity level, 
participants in this study were administered either Module 3 or Module 4, which are both 
intended for individuals with fluent speech. The ADOS was administered to adolescent 
participants only. 
Task Design 
  The experimental task was based on Diesendruck and Markson (2001, Study 1). This task 
employs a standard exclusivity paradigm for words: participants are shown two novel objects, 
one of which is given a novel label, then they are asked to choose an object using a second novel 
label. The same paradigm is also given using facts instead of labels (i.e., rather than labeling and 
requesting an object with a novel word, an object is described using a novel fact and requested 
using a second novel fact). These two conditions, hereafter the label and fact conditions, 
respectively, were administered within subjects with the order counterbalanced across 
participants. Mutual Exclusivity       18
  A subgroup of participants also received a control task, which was identical to the 
exclusivity task, except that an object was requested using the same novel label or fact that was 
given to the first object. This control task was always given after both experimental conditions 
were completed. 
Stimuli 
Twenty-four pairs of novel objects were used in this study. Novel objects consisted of 
unusual household items (e.g., a tea egg, a yellow plastic drain catcher) or novel artifacts created 
in the lab (e.g., a plastic lid glued to a wooden craft stick). Each item was distinct in appearance 
and most participants found them to be both interesting and unfamiliar.  
Novel Labels and Facts 
All novel words were single CVC syllables conforming to the rules of English phonology 
(e.g., “wug” and “jop”). Novel facts were statements such as “This one is from California” or 
“This is the one my sister gave me.” The twelve novel words and the twelve facts used in the 
exclusivity task can be found in Diesendruck and Markson (2001; Study 1).  
Procedure: Exclusivity Task 
  Label condition. In the training phase of each trial, the experimenter placed a pair of 
novel objects in front of the participant, one on either side of the table. The experimenter then 
picked up Object A and engaged the participant in joint attention by alternating her gaze between 
the child and the object, and looking at the object with fascination. Because attentional 
impairments in ASD have been noted to interfere with word learning (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), 
care was taken to ensure that the child or adolescent’s attention was on the object before 
proceeding. Despite their limitations, children with ASD orient to objects attended to by others 
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the object, the experimenter looked at it and labeled it three times, saying, “Here’s the jop. Look 
this is a jop. See the jop?” The experimenter then placed Object A back on the table, and picked 
up Object B. After the participant’s attention was on Object B, the experimenter looked at the 
object and said, “Oh look at this one. Isn’t it cool? This is nice.” The experimenter then placed 
Object B back on the table and allowed the participant to explore both objects for approximately 
30 seconds.  
  After this the experimenter proceeded to the question phase. The experimenter picked up 
both objects and placed them in their original locations. While looking at the participant (and not 
at either of the objects) the experimenter asked the participant for the referent of a second novel 
label, for example, “Can you give me the wug?” The experimenter provided no further 
information, but encouraged the participant to make a selection (e.g., if the participant was 
reluctant to make a choice, the experimenter stated, “just take your best guess”). After making a 
choice, the participant was thanked for providing one of the objects, but no explicit feedback was 
given. This procedure was repeated for six trials. The labeled object (i.e., Object A or Object B) 
alternated across trials. 
Fact condition: The procedure in the fact condition was the same as the label condition, 
with two exceptions. First, rather than labeling one of the objects with a novel word in the 
training phase, the experimenter provided a brief factual description, for example, “Look at this 
one, my sister gave this to me. See, my sister gave this to me. My sister gave me this.” Second, 
during the question phase, the experimenter asked the participant for the referent of a different 
fact, for example, “Can you give me the one my dog likes to play with?”  
The specific stimuli used for each condition, the side of presentation of these stimuli, and 
the order in which the label and fact conditions were presented were fully counterbalanced across Mutual Exclusivity       20
participants. To minimize the chance that participants would directly apply strategies that they 
had formed in the first condition to the second condition, the second condition was administered 
no sooner than two weeks after the first, with the exception of two adolescents with ASD who 
were given the second session after a delay of several hours. 
Procedure: Memory Control Task 
Twenty-seven participants with ASD and 24 participants with TD also completed a 
memory control task to test for differences in attention and memory that could affect 
performance on the experimental task. The procedure for the control task consisted of the same 
training phase as the mutual exclusivity task. In the question phase, however, the participant was 
queried using the same label or fact that was used in the training phase. For example, the 
experimenter would describe Object A as follows: “Here’s the jop. Look, this is a jop. See the 
jop?” and in the question phase, would ask, “Can you give me the jop?” This task was always 
administered subsequent to both the experimental label and fact conditions. 
All children were tested in a quiet room that was free from distractions. Testing took 
place in the participant’s home or school or in our laboratories at Harvard University or the 
University of Connecticut. On the first day of testing, participants completed the PPVT, ADOS 
(adolescent participants only), and the first condition (either label or fact) of the exclusivity task. 
Parents were also given the SCQ to complete. ASD participants who met inclusion criteria and 
TD participants who met inclusion criteria and were appropriately matched to the ASD group 
were invited back for a second day of testing, during which they completed the second condition 
of the mutual exclusivity task, and (for 51 participants) both conditions of the memory control 
task. In all cases, the experimenter was the same for both days of testing. Participants were Mutual Exclusivity       21
always seated across a table from the experimenter. A digital camera was positioned behind the 
experimenter to videotape participant responses.  
Results 
  Dependent variables were examined for deviations from the assumptions of normality 
and sphericity and were found to be normally distributed. We found no significant differences 
between our two age groups, therefore all data are presented collapsed across age group. 
Task Performance: Exclusivity Task 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with diagnostic group and condition as 
independent variables and task success (i.e., the proportion of unlabeled object choices) as the 
dependent variable revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 80) = 15.30, p < .001, 
partial  
2 = 0.16.  The main of effect of diagnostic group was nonsignificant, F(1, 80) = 1.20, p = 
.28, partial  
2 = 0.02, as was the group by condition interaction, F(1, 80) = 0.43, p = .51, partial 
 
2 = 0.01. These findings suggest that participants with ASD and participants with TD performed 
similarly on both conditions. Post hoc t-tests revealed that labels were treated as mutually 
exclusive more reliably than facts by both the ASD group t (41) = 3.40, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 
0.77, and the TD group, t (39) = 2.22, p = .03, Cohen’s d = 0.53 (Figure 1). This discrepancy 
suggests that different mechanisms underlie performance on the fact and label conditions. 
Although participants were more likely to choose the unlabeled object in the label condition than 
in the fact condition, performance for both groups was above chance on both conditions (ASD 
label, t (41) = 31.70, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.03; ASD fact, t (41) = 14.62, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.58; TD label, t (39) = 23.22, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.57; TD fact, t (39) = 17.86, p < .001, 
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  To investigate effects of order, separate two-way ANOVAs were performed on the label 
and fact conditions, with diagnostic group and condition order as independent variables, and task 
success as the dependent variable. For the label condition, there was no significant main effect of 
group, F(1, 78) = 0.09, p = .77, partial  
2 = 0.001, or order, F(1, 78) = 0.42, p = .52, partial  
2 = 
0.01, and no group by order interaction, F(1, 78) = 2.18, p = .14, partial  
2 = 0.03. For the fact 
condition, there was no main effect of group, F(1, 78) = 1.65, p = .20, partial  
2 = 0.02, and no 
group by order interaction, F(1, 78) = 1.93, p = .17, partial  
2 = 0.02. However, for the fact 
condition only, the main effect of order was significant, F(1, 78) = 12.91, p = .001, partial  
2 = 
0.14 (order effect presented in Table 2). Children and adolescents who received the label 
condition first (and, therefore, had experienced one version of the task) performed significantly 
better on the fact condition than children and adolescents who received the fact condition first 
and had no task experience. In other words, participants were more likely to treat facts as 
mutually exclusive once they had already done so with labels. In contrast, condition order had no 
effect on label performance; that is, prior experience with the fact task did not increase 
participants’ tendency to treat labels as mutually exclusive. This order effect suggests that 
participants generalized from the label condition to the fact condition, but not from the fact 
condition to the label condition.  
Individual Difference Analyses 
At the group level, participants with ASD and participants with TD performed equally 
well on both the label and fact conditions. We were further interested in how individual 
differences in social pragmatic skill might relate to task performance. To explore these possible 
effects, we compared individual performance on the label and fact conditions to scores on a 
measure of socio-communicative impairment, the SCQ. Due to the non-parametric nature of the Mutual Exclusivity       23
task performance data, Spearman’s rho was used for correlation analyses. Children and 
adolescents who treated facts as mutually exclusive more reliably were found to have lower SCQ 
communication scores (i.e., fewer behaviors associated with ASD communication symptoms); 
Spearman’s rho (75) = -.29, p = .01. This finding supports the idea that the fact condition taps 
social pragmatic skills. In contrast, participants’ SCQ communication scores were not correlated 
with performance on the label condition, Spearman’s rho (75) = -.10, p = .41, suggesting that 
social pragmatic skills are unrelated to performance on the label condition. 
  If the tendency to succeed on an exclusivity task is truly related to vocabulary 
development, then we should expect that children and adolescents who are more successful on an 
exclusivity task will build larger vocabularies. To test this hypothesis, we compared our 
participants’ performance on the label condition with their receptive vocabulary size, as assessed 
by the PPVT. PPVT standard scores were significantly positively correlated with performance on 
the label condition, Spearman’s rho (82) = .40, p < .001, but not with performance on the fact 
condition, Spearman’s rho (82) = .17, p = .13. Children and adolescents who consistently treat 
words as mutually exclusive have larger receptive vocabularies, whereas children who treat facts 
as mutually exclusive do not. 
  If the same form of reasoning underlies performance on both the label and the fact 
conditions, then successful performance on these two tasks should be correlated. In fact, label 
performance was uncorrelated with fact performance for the sample as a whole, Spearman’s rho 
(82) = .04, p = .76, and within each diagnostic group (ASD: Spearman’s rho (42) = .09, p = .59; 
TD: Spearman’s rho (40) = -.07, p = .66). This finding further suggests that performance on the 
two conditions is supported by distinct mechanisms. 
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  Twenty-seven participants with ASD and 24 participants with TD also completed a 
memory control task to test for the possibility of differences in attention and memory for the two 
conditions that may have affected performance. We found that memory for facts was 
significantly better than memory for labels, removing any concern that the facts were simply 
harder to process or retain. After comparing performance on the experimental task to 
performance on the control task, we found that participants were as successful on the 
experimental label condition as they were on the control label condition, t (50) = .242, p = .81, 
Cohen’s d = 0.06. In contrast, participants performed significantly worse on the experimental 
fact condition than the control fact condition, t (50) = 5.25, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.04, with a 
large effect size (Figure 2). The use of a mutual exclusivity strategy for labels was as efficient as 
explicitly being taught an object label. In contrast, using mutual exclusivity to identify the 
referent of a fact was significantly less reliable than simply being taught a fact about an object.  
When we include only participants who achieved perfect performance on both the label 
and the fact control conditions (N = 31), we continue to find that labels are treated as mutually 
exclusive more reliably than facts (label mean: 94% correct, fact mean: 75% correct; t (30) = 
3.04, p = .005, Cohen’s d = 0.77). After splitting perfect performers by diagnostic group, we 
found that, although both groups performed better on the label condition (ASD mean: 94% 
correct, TD mean: 94% correct) than on the fact condition (ASD mean: 61%, TD mean: 85% 
correct), this difference only reached significance in the ASD group, t (12) = 3.22, p = .007, 
Cohen’s d = 1.14, and not in the TD group, t (17) = 1.27, p = .22, Cohen’s d = 0.46. 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to contrast two competing hypotheses about the nature of 
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account, mutual exclusivity is one manifestation of a broader tendency to assume that speakers 
will use the same form for a given referent within a single discourse. The pragmatic account is 
consistent with Hypothesis A (see Introduction), that a single factor underlies performance on 
both label and fact conditions. In contrast, according to the lexical constraints account (consistent 
with Hypothesis B), mutual exclusivity is specific to word learning, and does not apply to other 
speech acts. On this account, distinct factors are proposed to underlie children’s tendency to treat 
words and facts as mutually exclusive. In the present study, we found that children and 
adolescents with ASD and children and adolescents with TD showed mutual exclusivity for both 
words and facts; however, this tendency was far more reliable for words than for facts. The 
control task demonstrated that this relationship was not due simply to facts being harder to 
process or remember. Because our sample included children with variable pragmatic and 
linguistic skills, we were able to examine individual differences in performance. We found that 
performance on the label and fact conditions was uncorrelated and that the label and fact 
conditions were associated with different variables. Specifically, children with better social 
communication skills were more likely to treat facts as exclusive, suggesting that pragmatic 
skills underlie this ability. In contrast, children with larger vocabularies were more likely to treat 
words as exclusive, suggesting a connection to lexical skills. These findings strongly suggest that 
distinct mechanisms underlie performance on the label and fact conditions. Here we will review 
the implications of these findings for mutual exclusivity in ASD and the feasibility of the 
pragmatic hypothesis of mutual exclusivity, and then revisit the domain-specific lexical 
hypothesis and the domain-general hypothesis in light of these results. 
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Children and adolescents with ASD offer a unique window into typical language 
acquisition processes. By studying the ways in which these remarkable individuals learn 
language despite their significant impairments in social interaction and nonverbal 
communication skills, we may gain additional leverage on the contribution of the different skills 
that children bring to the task of language acquisition. In addition to contributing to our 
understanding of typical language development, this paper offers insight into word learning 
processes for children with ASD. Specifically, we extend Preissler and Carey (2005) by 
demonstrating that individuals with ASD use mutual exclusivity to successfully determine the 
referents of novel words, in the absence of any confound between novelty and exclusivity. 
One limitation of our study is that we included only children and adolescents with high-
functioning ASD, thus the present findings may not generalize to more low-functioning children. 
Preissler and Carey’s (2005) study demonstrates that even nonverbal children succeed in a 
novelty task, suggesting that, at the very least, a novelty preference for words is present in 
children at all points along the autism spectrum. This conclusion is supported by a recent study 
of word learning in children with ASD with substantial language impairments (Parish-Morris et 
al., 2007). In an experiment exploring the role of perceptual salience in word learning 
(Experiment 2), the authors included a probe with the essential features of an exclusivity task 
(two objects, one labeled directly, the other requested with a second label). The results suggested 
that these three- to seven-year-olds with ASD treated the second label as mutually exclusive.
2  In 
                                                        
2 Because these authors were not specifically interested in mutual exclusivity, they did not 
present any statistical analyses to support the presence of this bias. However, the data that is 
reported suggests that mutual exclusivity is present in this population (Table 3, Parish-Morris et 
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sum, the current evidence suggests that, despite impairments in social pragmatics, individuals 
with ASD, across age and ability levels, use mutual exclusivity to learn words.  
Nevertheless, there appear to be individual differences in the effectiveness with which 
children employ this strategy or the degree to which they adhere to it. Our finding that strong use 
of mutual exclusivity was related to vocabulary knowledge might predict a lower degree of 
adherence to mutual exclusivity in lower functioning children (with lower vocabulary levels).  
Consistent with this conjecture, adherence to exclusivity in the Parish-Morris (2007) study is 
substantially lower than in the present experiment (70% vs. 86%), though the methodological 
differences between the two experiments make this difference difficult to interpret. Additional 
research will be required to determine whether adherence to mutual exclusivity is a cause of 
greater vocabulary knowledge. The correlation could potentially reflect effects of variation in 
phonological processing and verbal working memory on both vocabulary acquisition and 
memory for the first novel word in this exclusivity task. 
Testing the Pragmatic Hypothesis 
The pragmatic account proposes that a single mechanism (e.g., the principle of contrast) 
underlies both the tendency to treat words contrastively and the tendency to treat facts 
contrastively. Thus it follows that performance on the label and fact conditions should be 
correlated, and that any individual differences that are associated with mutual exclusivity for 
words should also be associated with mutual exclusivity for facts. We found that the predictors 
of performance for the two conditions were different and that performance across the two 
conditions was uncorrelated, suggesting that distinct mechanisms drive mutual exclusivity for 
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Individual performance on the label condition was positively correlated with receptive 
vocabulary ability. This finding is consistent with previous work with infants that found a 
positive association between expressive vocabulary size and performance on a novelty task 
(Graham et al., 1998). These are important findings, because they confirm that the tendency to 
avoid lexical overlap may be critical to vocabulary development. In the present study, 
performance on the fact condition was not correlated with performance on the receptive 
vocabulary test. This finding is difficult to interpret within a pragmatic account of word learning, 
which proposes that vocabulary development is grounded in the same referential inference 
process that allows children to interpret facts as mutually exclusive in this task.  
Although unrelated to vocabulary size, the fact condition was associated with ASD 
communication symptoms, such that children with better communication skills were more likely 
to treat facts as mutually exclusive. This finding supports the premise that the fact condition 
depends on children’s pragmatic abilities, as Diesendruck and Markson (2001) suggest. In 
contrast, performance in the label condition was not associated with communication skills. 
Again, this is problematic for the pragmatic hypothesis, which proposes that the same pragmatic 
skills should underlie the contrastive interpretation of words. Taken together, individual 
difference measures suggest that the two conditions are associated with different factors: the 
label condition with vocabulary, and the fact condition with communication and social pragmatic 
skills. This pattern of differential correlation also suggests that the critical associations are not 
solely attributable to a common association with some domain-general factor (such as IQ), which 
would presumably influence performance in both conditions equally.  
Our findings suggest that mutual exclusivity for words is more robust than mutual 
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performance was considerably lower than it was in the label condition. In fact, our data suggest 
that older children and adolescents are actually less likely to treat facts as contrastive than three-
year-olds are. The first block of trials in our within subjects design is comparable to the between 
subjects design used in Diesendruck and Markson (2001); the tasks used similar stimuli and 
procedures, and the same labels and facts. The three-year-olds in that experiment succeeded on 
82% of the label trials and 73% of the fact trials. Our TD sample of older children and teens 
showed similar performance for words (85%) but lower performance for facts (60%). Critically, 
the mean for facts performance in the Diesendruck and Markson study is not within the 95% 
confidence interval for our data, suggesting that three-year-olds are more likely to treat facts as 
mutually exclusive than older children and adolescents. This could reflect deeper processing of 
the facts by the older children. In both studies, the facts were paired so that they would not 
logically exclude one another (my sister gave it to me vs. I keep it under my bed).  The older 
children in this study may have been more adept at determining when facts are incompatible, and 
thus may have realized that both facts could be used to refer to the same object. They may also 
be more accustomed to hearing a single object described in multiple ways, or be more able to 
think about an object in multiple ways (see e.g., Flavell, Flavell & Green, 1983).  
The order effect observed in this study provides further support for the robustness of 
mutual exclusivity for words. Participants in our study showed an asymmetric pattern of 
generalization (Table 2). Those who received the label condition before the fact condition were 
far more likely to make the contrastive inference for facts, suggesting that they generalized a 
robust exclusivity strategy from words to facts. In contrast, participants who received the fact 
condition before the label condition performed no better on the label condition, suggesting that 
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showed a marginal decline (p = .07) when the label task followed the fact task. This asymmetry 
suggests that participants initially bring very different strategies to the label versus the fact tasks.  
In the case of the label task, participants have a strategy available that supports a robust 
contrastive inference (e.g., a lexical constraint); this strategy is not available in the facts task. 
However, they seem to generalize from this lexical strategy when confronted with a parallel task 
involving novel facts (perhaps by thinking of the facts as names or labels). In contrast, 
participants who received the facts task first may not have had a stable and consistent strategy to 
apply. This was apparent in some of the older participants’ reactions to the fact task – despite 
above chance performance, many stated that they were “just guessing.” 
The control task allowed us to look only at participants who were reliably able to 
remember novel labels and facts (i.e., those who were at ceiling on both control conditions). We 
found that the TD group was equally likely to treat labels and facts as mutually exclusive; the 
ASD group, however, treated labels as mutually exclusive more reliably than facts. Thus, when 
we remove some of the variability associated with faltering attention and memory, we find that 
the fact condition is sensitive to diagnostic status, unlike the label condition, further suggesting 
that performance on the label condition does not depend on social pragmatics.
3  
                                                        
  We do not wish to suggest that social pragmatics play no role in word learning. In fact, there is 
clear evidence that social attentional cues such as gaze direction (Baldwin et al., 1996) and joint 
attention (Woodward, Markman, & Fitzsimmons, 1994), and social intentional cues, such as 
discourse novelty (Tomasello & Akhtar, 1995) and the purposefulness of labeling acts 
(Diesendruck, Markson, Akhtar, & Reudor, 2004), contribute to word learning. Further, 
children’s interpretations of speakers’ communicative intentions may override their default 
assumptions (e.g., constraints) about word-object mappings, for example, in the presence of 
explicit instruction (Diesendruck, Markson, & Bloom, 2003) or unreliable speakers (Scofield & 
Behrend, 2008). What we wish to emphasize is that the ability to understand communicative 
intent does not appear to play a major role in the mutual exclusivity bias, which is intact in 
children and adolescents with ASD despite their significant impairments in pragmatics and social 
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The Lexical Constraints Hypothesis for Mutual Exclusivity 
Our finding that exclusivity is stronger for labels, or words, than it is for facts suggests 
that the former does not merely reflect the operation of a pragmatic principle of referential 
contrast. Any such principle would apply equally in both cases, predicting equivalent 
performance. Instead, mutual exclusivity for words must depend, at least in part, on another 
mechanism which supports a more robust contrastive inference. This is fully predicted by the 
hypothesis that mutual exclusivity is a domain-specific constraint that is limited to word 
learning, and perhaps some versions of the domain-general account (see below). 
Specifically, the lexical constraints account predicts that in situations of referential 
ambiguity, lexical constraints will provide a strategy for disambiguation that is available only to 
words, and not to other speech acts. It follows that words should be treated as mutually exclusive 
more consistently than facts, which is precisely what the present data suggest. In fact, our control 
experiment demonstrated that, in the case of words, referential disambiguation via mutual 
exclusivity was as robust as referential disambiguation via ostensive naming; not so for facts. 
From a functional perspective one might wonder why a lexical constraint would exist 
when a general pragmatic bias is available as well. We see three possible advantages to having 
this domain-specific mechanism. First, all data to date suggest that exclusivity for facts emerges 
during the preschool years, long after exclusivity for words (Scofield & Behrend, 2007; 
Markman et al., 2003). This suggests that the pragmatic abilities that underlie contrastive 
inferences for referential acts in general may develop too late to help word learning get off the 
ground. For developmental psychologists this may seem counter-intuitive: given the mounting 
evidence for sophisticated social reasoning in infants, it may seem surprising that toddlers would 
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work on children’s ability to calculate pragmatic inferences about the interpretation of linguistic 
forms. On the pragmatic hypothesis, mutual exclusivity involves the recognition that using the 
novel form to refer to a previously labeled object would constitute a violation of a pragmatic 
principle (Clark’s principle of contrast or Grice’s maxim of manner). There is an extensive body 
of evidence demonstrating that the ability to make inferences on the basis of violations of 
Gricean maxims develops gradually over early and middle childhood (see e.g., Noveck, 2001; 
Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Huang & Snedeker, in press).   
Second, mutual exclusivity as a lexical constraint supports inferences which carry across 
speakers and conversations. At its simplest, the pragmatic hypothesis does not.  On the pragmatic 
hypothesis, the inference that the speaker will use the same term to refer to the previously 
labeled object implies that the speaker has used this term for this object in the past and realizes 
that the listener knows this. This inference should not extend to a new speaker (or perhaps to a 
conversation taking place at another time). In contrast, mutual exclusivity for words should apply 
across speakers, since as a lexical principle it makes no reference to speakers or their mental 
states. Diesendruck and Markson (2001) found that three-year-olds make exclusivity inferences 
across speakers for words but not for facts. On the face of it, this pattern appears to support the 
hypothesis that mutual exclusivity for words is subserved by a different mechanism than mutual 
exclusivity for facts. The authors, however, interpret this data as evidence for children’s 
knowledge of Clark’s principle of conventionality, which states that some meanings have 
conventional forms that speakers in a linguistic community expect each other to use. Is the 
principle of conventionality a pragmatic constraint or a lexical one? Diesendruck and Markson 
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meanings and forms is co-extensive with the lexicon it is not clear that such a distinction can be 
made.    
Finally, having a separate constraint to treat words as mutually exclusive could allow 
children to adjust the strength of this lexical bias without altering the strength of any 
commitment they might have about the contrastiveness of other referential acts. The existing 
evidence suggests that exclusivity for words and facts have very different developmental 
trajectories. Exclusivity for words is strong from infancy on but becomes more robust with time; 
exclusivity for facts appears to peak at around four years of age. This could reflect differences in 
the normative value of each bias at different ages. The factors which influence the 
contrastiveness of referential acts are potentially different than the factors which influence the 
degree to which objects labels are mutually exclusive. If the biases arise via separate 
mechanisms, then, in an adaptive learning system, they could potentially be adjusted 
independently or conditioned on different information.  
Domain-general Hypotheses for Mutual Exclusivity 
On the face of it, our findings seem problematic for domain-general accounts of mutual 
exclusivity. Accounts of this kind attribute mutual exclusivity to general properties of learning 
systems such as competition between representations during processing and acquisition or a 
general tendency to prefer simpler hypotheses or one-to-one mappings (Frank, et al., 2009; 
Regier, 2003). The resilience of mutual exclusivity in children with pragmatic deficits is 
expected on these theories. However, the discrepancy between exclusivity for facts and words is 
not. If a bias for one-to-one mappings is simply attributable to a general property of all learning 
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Thus there is clearly one sense in which mutual exclusivity is domain-specific: by middle 
childhood it applies robustly to words but only weakly (if at all) to facts. But this domain-
specific behavior could arise from learning processes that are largely domain-general. There are 
several ways in which this might transpire.   
First, one could envision two parallel systems of mappings, built out the same domain-
general pieces, which gradually diverge over development. Perhaps both the mappings from 
words to their referents and the mappings from facts to objects are achieved by associative 
networks with an initial bias for one-to-one mappings. If this bias were adaptive, so that it could 
be strengthened when the data supported it or weakened when it was counterproductive, then the 
two systems might diverge over time (see Smith et al., 2002 for a similar account of the shape 
bias). Such an account would be consistent with the developmental trajectory that emerges when 
we compare the present study with Diesendruck and Markson (2001). Three-year-olds may 
initially treat facts and words as exclusive, based on a domain-general bias for simple mappings. 
As children gain more experience with facts, they may learn that most objects are associated with 
a range of facts both within and across speakers, which could lead them to adjust their bias 
accordingly. In contrast, while a given object can be described by more than one count noun, our 
strong tendency to repeatedly use the same high frequency basic level terms may ensure that 
mutual exclusivity remains an adaptive bias for word learning. Developmental change of this 
kind would be consistent with the domain-general, adaptive accounts offered by Smith (1999; 
Smith et al., 2002) and Regier (2005).  
Second, in domain-general models of mutual exclusivity, the bias arises because word 
learning is viewed as a mapping process between stable forms at two (or more) levels of 
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would be expected. Facts, unlike simple words, have internal structure. When we interpret a fact 
we do not simply map the form to a referent or concept, we construct a representation of its 
meaning though a process of semantic composition. Thus if exclusivity only emerges in systems 
that learn simple, stable mappings, facts might not be affected.
4   
A closer look at Frank’s (2009) model hints at some of the ways in which domain-
specific data patterns like ours could arise from a combination of domain-specific levels of 
representation and a domain-general learning algorithm. Frank models word learning as 
involving two mappings. First, there is a mapping that is made between objects in a given 
context and the word tokens that are uttered, mediated by a representation of the speaker’s 
intentions. Second, there is a mapping between word types and object categories which forms the 
lexicon and is assumed to be stable across situations. In its current instantiation the model is not 
equipped to handle facts and their meanings (it lacks compositional semantics, treats a word as 
the unit of reference, and represents the world as consisting solely of objects).  However, any 
version of this model that did represent the referential use of facts would presumably have to do 
so by mapping tokens of factual descriptions to their referents via the model of the speaker’s 
referential intentions.  A pragmatic bias might be captured at that level. It is not clear that these 
mappings would or should result in lexical entries since the words that compose the facts all have 
other uses and thus appear when the reference object is absent. In the case of two novel objects, 
it appears that exclusivity effects in the model would arise solely from a bias for one-to-one 
lexical mappings (see discussion of Xu, 2002 in Frank et al., 2009). If facts do not have lexical 
entries then no such bias is expected. 
                                                        
4 Of course this explanation begs the question of how a child knows the kind of problem that she 
is confronted with.  But since this question is likely to be troublesome for all theories, we put it 
aside for now. Mutual Exclusivity       36
In sum, the current study was not designed to compare domain-specific lexical accounts 
with domain-general emergentist accounts, and our findings are consistent with both the 
possibility of a domain-specific lexical constraint, and with the possibility of a domain-general 
mechanism that gives rise to a strong bias for mutual exclusivity in words but not in facts. 
Conclusions 
  Our results demonstrate that high-functioning children with ASD can use mutual 
exclusivity to infer that a novel word refers to an object that has not been named. This extends 
the findings of Preissler and Carey (2005) by showing that children with ASD are not merely 
matching novelty-to-novelty but actually interpreting words as referring to mutually exclusive 
categories of objects. Furthermore, we found that exclusivity for words was more robust in 
several respects than exclusivity for facts, both in typically developing children and in children 
with ASD. Mutual exclusivity for words was associated with vocabulary size while mutual 
exclusivity for facts was associated with social pragmatic skills. These results suggest that 
different mechanisms account for children’s tendencies to treat words and facts contrastively, 
and are inconsistent with the pragmatic hypothesis, which is based on the premise that a single 
factor underlies both tendencies. These results are consistent with domain-specific theories in 
which mutual exclusivity is a lexical constraint and also with theories in which domain-general 
mechanisms give rise to domain-specific patterns of interpretation.  
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Table 1 
Demographic and Symptom Severity Variables by Diagnostic and Age Group 
 
        ASD kids M (SD)  TD kids M (SD)  ASD teens M (SD)  TD teens M (SD) 
    Range     Range     Range     Range 
 
N        26      24      16      16 
Gender (M:F)     22 : 4      14 : 10     14 : 2      14 : 2 
CA
a (years)      8.1 (2.3)    7.6 (2.2)    15.1 (1.2)    14.9 (1.3) 
        4.2 – 11.8     4.9 – 11.9    13.1 – 16.9     12.8 – 17.6 
PPVT (standard score)  112 (19)    118 (12)    113 (12)    119 (8) 
        87 – 148     86 – 139     92 – 135     105 – 137  
SCQ 
  Total      20 (5)      3 (2)      21 (7)      2 (3) 
        13 – 31     0 – 8       10 – 29     0 – 9  
  RSI
b      6 (3)      0 (1)      8 (4)      0 (1) 
        1 – 12      0 – 2       2 – 13      0 – 2  Mutual Exclusivity       47
  Communication    7 (2)      2 (1)      6 (3)      1 (2) 
        1 – 10      0 – 4       2 – 9       0 – 7  
RBI
c      6 (2)      1 (1)      6 (2)      0 (1) 
      1 – 8       0 – 3       1 – 8       0 – 2  
 
Note: Fifteen is the threshold on the SCQ for autism spectrum disorders; higher scores indicate greater severity.  There were 7 children 
in the ASD group who were below threshold on this parent-report questionnaire. Diagnoses for these participants relied on the 
existence of pre-existing diagnosis by an experienced professional. 
a CA = Chronological age 
b RSI = Reciprocal social interaction 
c RBI = Repetitive behaviors and interests 
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Table 2 
Proportion of Responses Treated as Mutually Exclusive, by Order, Group, and Condition. 
 
      Tested first  Tested second Improvement
a   t (df)    p 
 
ASD 
  Label M (SD)    90% (15)  81% (19)  - 9%    1.85 (40)  .07 
Fact M (SD)    61% (32)  74% (27)  + 13%   1.40 (40)  .17 
TD 
Label M (SD)    85% (24)  89% (24)  + 4%    -0.50 (38)  .62 
Fact M (SD)    60% (22)  89% (22)  + 29%   4.12 (38)  <.001
 
Note. Values in the Tested first column represent the percent of unlabeled object choices for the 
first condition administered. Values in the Tested second column represent performance on the 
second condition administered. Improvement values reflect the mean difference between 
participants who received the given condition first and those who received the condition second. 
T-tests were performed to test this mean difference. 
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Figure Captions 
  Figure 1.Percentage of trials on which participants treated labels and facts as mutually 
exclusive, by diagnostic group. Chance performance for both conditions is 50%; t-tests against 
chance performance for all four cells were reliable (p < .001). 
  Figure 2. Comparison of control task and exclusivity task for participants who received 
both. For the control task the correct referent is the labeled object, for the exclusivity task the 
correct referent is the unlabeled object. 
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90%  89% 97% 74%